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Court finds homeowner's policy is a
policy of vehicle insurance
Brettman countered that the court should
follow the reasoning of the court in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Eggermont., 535 N.E.2d 1047 (I11.App. Ct. 1989),
where the court held a household exclusion inapplicable
under § 143.01(a). Examining a policy and a household
exclusion almost identical to Brettman's, the Eggermont
court held that the policy was indeed one of vehicle
insurance because it contained a large number of
exceptions to its vehicle exclusion, and thereby provided
limited liability vehicle coverage. In addition, the court
found that the lawnmower which caused the injury was a
vehicle under § 4. Therefore, despite the fact that the
policy was entitled a "homeowner's policy," the
lawnmower was a vehicle, the policy was one of
"vehicle insurance," and the court applied § 143.01 (a).
Brettman's homeowner's policy included a

vehicle exclusion and exceptions to the exclusion
identical to those in Eggermont. Additionally, in both
Eggermont's and Brettman's policies, the Family
Liability Protection coverage section included a definition of an insured person intended for use in connection
with coverage of vehicles. The court in the present case
agreed with the court in Eggermont that the provisions
included in Brettman's policy suggested that the policy
contemplated coverage of vehicular liability, at least in
some circumstances.
The court held that the Allstate homeowner's
insurance policy issued to Brettman was a policy of
vehicle insurance and applied § 143.01(a), nullifying the
household exclusion. Consequently, household exclusions barring insurance coverage for physical or
property damages, when the benefits of the coverage
"would accrue directly or indirectly to an insured
person," are inapplicable under Illinois law, when the
policy is also one for vehicle insurance.

Associate attorney susceptible to suit by law firm
partner
by Michael Foster

In Kramer v. Nowak, 1995
WL 753857 (D. Pa.), the district
court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania recognized a cause of
action for negligence in representing
clients, brought by supervising
attorneys against subordinate
attorneys. Additionally, the court
held that dismissal of a contribution
claim for attorney malpractice is not
required, under the principle of
respondeatsuperior,based on
determination that the attorney
against whom contribution is sought
was in fact an employee and not an
independent contractor.
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Client unhappy with
award
While in his final semester
at Rutgers University Law School,
Jeffrey Nowak ("Nowark") was
hired by attorney Steven Kramer
("Kramer") to work on a large
antitrust case, Lightning Lube, Inc. v.
Witco Corp., 802 F. Supp. 1180
(D.N.J. 1992), then pending in
federal court. Upon admission to the
New Jersey bar, Nowak's name was
listed as an associate on the Kramer
firm's letterhead. For approximately
five years, Nowak worked out of
Lightning Lube's office in New
Jersey, all the while under the

direction of Kramer, from either his
New York or Philadelphia office.
Nowak prepared and submitted
numerous documents on behalf of
Kramer for Lightning Lube. Of
particular significance was a motion
for prejudgment interest in the
amount of four million dollars.
Lightning Lube eventually
prevailed in its litigation with Witco
Corporation but was dissatisfied
with the 11.5 million dollar judgement recovered. Lightning Lube
filed a malpractice suit against
Kramer alleging that his negligent
representation resulted in Lightning
Lube receiving a significantly
smaller judgment than merited by its
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claims.

materials by the respective parties.

Malpractice judgment
prompts partnerto sue
associate

Associate or independent

The malpractice claim
resulted in an award of $440,000
against Kramer. Subsequently,
Kramer filed suit against Nowak for
contribution asserting that the
malpractice judgment was a repercussion of Nowak's conduct while
he was an independent contractor for
Lightning Lube. Specifically, the
conduct complained of was a
miscalculation of prejudgment
interest. Kramer's complaint also
included negligence and breach of
contract claims. In response, Nowak
moved to dismiss or, alternatively,
for summary judgment on the
following grounds: (1) Nowak was
Kramer's employee and not an
independent contractor; as there had
been no finding that Nowak and
Kramer were joint tortfeasors, the
contribution claim should be
dismissed; (2) the complaint
asserted no duty owed by Nowak to
Kramer and, hence, the negligence
claim fails; and (3) the breach of
contract claim did not specify any
contractual provision that Nowak
failed to perform.
The court, pursuant to
Federal Rule 12(b), construed the
motion with respect to all claims, as
one for summary judgment in light
of its uncertainty as to how the
motion had been understood by both
sides. As such, the remainder of the
opinion was devoted to highlighting
the legal principles which governed
the court's ultimate resolution of the
summary judgment motion. The
decision was stayed to allow for
submission of supplementary
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contractor
The court did resolve
whether Nowak was in Kramer's
employ since both parties had
treated the motion as seeking
summary judgment, not dismissal,
with regard to particular issue. In
support of his contention regarding
Nowak's independent contractor
status, Kramer directed the court's
attention to the fact that Lightning
Lube paid Nowak his salary.
Notwithstanding, the court noted
that under New Jersey law, it is the
control retained by the employer
over the other's work which
determines whether one is an
independent contractor. Nowak was
required to fax a daily log of his
work to Kramer and submit all
drafts to Kramer for approval; was
instructed on how to proceed with
various assignments; and all
documents filed in the Lightning
Lube litigation beared Kramer's
name only. Additionally, Kramer
made the arrangements concerning
Nowak's pay and accommodations.
The court held that Nowak was not
an independent contractor due to the
extensive supervision retained by
Kramer over Nowak's work. The
court pointed out that even Kramer's
own letterhead listed Nowak as an
associate of the firm. Nevertheless,
the court did not believe such a
conclusion mandated dismissal of
the suit. The court emphasized that
the principle of respondeat superior,
relied upon by Nowak, does not
preclude an employer from seeking
contribution from an employee;
instead it only establishes an

employer's liability with respect to
an injured third party.
Turning next to New
Jersey's contribution law, N.J.S.A.
Sec. 2A:53A-1, and the New Jersey
Supreme Court's interpretation of
that statute, the district court found
that because New Jersey treats a
principal and agent as a "single
tortfeasor," contribution actions are
not allowed between employer and
employee unless it can be shown
that the employee acted for his own
personal gain. Therefore, the court
instructed that unless Kramer could
produce evidence demonstrating that
he and Nowak had proceeded as
independent "economic entities" in
preparing the prejudgment interest
motion, summary judgment would
be granted in favor of Nowak with
respect to the contribution claim.

Nature of the tort
Kramer alleged that Nowak
negligently and "tortiously" prepared the prejudgment interest
motion. Although Kramer's complaint failed to articulate what duties
Nowak owed and in what fashion
those duties were breached, the
court construed the negligence claim
as encompassing those duties
generally owed by agents to their
principals. Accordingly, Nowak
owed Kramer a duty to perform his
obligations with the requisite skill
and care common to the profession.
In assessing the circumstances when
a partner in a law firm may sue an
associate for an alleged breach of
duty, the court found came across
very little precedent to guide its
decision.
Recognizing the signifi-
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cance of an attorney's primary and
uncompromising duty to his or her
client, the court cautiously evaluated
whether the imposition of other
duties is appropriate in this setting.
Relying on Pollack v. Lytle, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), the
court concluded that public policy
considerations do not justify
immunizing associate attorneys from
suits brought by their employers.
The court conceded that associates
may face a dilemma if and when
their duty to their client conflicts
with a corresponding duty to their
firm. The court recognized, however, that many professions confront
and successfully manage similar
conflict of interest problems. Such
concern, in the court's view, does not
rationalize creating an attorney
exception to the general principles
of agency law where none exists for
other professions.

Rule 11 Application
Citing the Restatement
(Second) of Agency (§ 82-104), the
court determined that if Kramer
authorized Nowak's conduct in
calculating the prejudgment interest
at issue, then Nowak was not subject
to any resulting liabilities. Kramer
claims not to have approved the
motion before it was filed, but the
court noted that Nowak, as was
standard practice between Kramer
and Nowak, signed Kramer's name
to the motion. Consequently,
Kramer's signature, under Federal
Rule 11, amounts to a representation
that he made a reasonable inquiry as
to whether the motion was warranted by both law and fact. The
district court stated that it would
reject Kramer's argument that he
"completely delegated" the preparation of the prejudgment motion to
Nowak, unless Kramer produced

sufficient evidence demonstrating
that he neither endorsed Nowak's
alleged negligence nor could have
discovered the miscalculation of the
prejudgment interest through
reasonable inquiry, as required by
Rule 11.
Finally, the court observed
that Kramer's breach of contract
claim asserted an implied duty on
the part of Nowak to exercise
ordinary knowledge and skill in the
execution of his professional
responsibilities. The court found this
standard of care to be identical to
that at issue in the tort claim, and
therefore both claims were equally
contingent upon whether Kramer
could show that he did not sanction
Nowak's alleged negligence and
could not have discovered that the
prejudgment interest calculation was
inaccurate through reasonable
inquiry.

Ice cream retailer held to be incidental beneficiary of
competitor's lease
by JenniferL. Schilling
In MBD Enterprises, Inc. v.American Nat'l
Bank of Chicago, 655 N.E.2d 1061 (Iii. App. Ct.
1995), a yogurt retailer filed a breach of contract claim
against the landlord of a shopping center and sought
injunctive relief and specific performance against
another tenant of the shopping center. The court held
that the plaintiff yogurt retailer did not have a cause of
action for breach of contract when the defendant
landlord leased space to Frosty Putter, a full service
restaurant which included yogurt and ice cream on its
menu. The court also held that the plaintiff could not
obtain injunctive relief or specific performance to
invoke the terms of Frosty Putter's lease, which prohib-
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ited sale of ice cream and yogurt in its building. The
court found that the plaintiffs were merely incidental
beneficiaries to Frosty Putter's lease, and, therefore, had
no authority to enforce its provisions.
The plaintiff, MBD Enterprises, Inc., which
does business as Love That Yogurt, entered into a 10
year lease with American National Bank of Chicago
("defendant landlord") for retail space in the Park Center
Shopping Center ("Center"). The plaintiff leased space
in Building M of the Center for the purpose of selling
yogurt and ice cream. The lease specifications restricted
the defendant landlord from leasing other space in the
Center to an operation whose "principal business is the
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